Fukushima disaster "made in Japan"
9 Jul 2012
Tokyo – The disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was “man-made” and not the unforeseeable result of the natural catastrophes that rocked Japan on 11 March, 2011, the Japanese government’s report into the accident has found.
Although triggered by the cataclysmic earthquake and tsunami, the category 7 nuclear accident cannot be regarded as a natural disaster, said the report from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission.
The Commission, instead, linked the direct causes of accident to “collusion” between the Japanese government, regulators such as NISA (the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency) and owner/operator TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Co.).
For instance, it said, the responsible parties ignored a need to take even basic measures to protect the site, such as implementing structural reinforcements – as had been required by new industry guidelines.
“It was a profoundly man-made disaster - that could and should have been foreseen and prevented. And its effects could have been mitigated by a more effective human response,” said Kiyoshi Kurokawa, chairman of the Commission.
This view reflects the findings of the report, which lists “a multitude of errors and wilful negligence” that left the Fukushima plant unprepared for the events of 11 March. There were also, it found, serious deficiencies in the response to the accident by owner/operator TEPCO, regulators and the government.
“What must be admitted - very painfully - is that this was a disaster “Made in Japan.” said Kurokawa. “Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; our groupism; and our insularity.”
The disastrous outcome at Fukushima would, therefore, probably been the same if other Japanese people had been in charge of regulating, engineering and operating the facility, the Commission chairman suggested.
The official report traces the roots of the accident back to the oil crises of the 1970s, which led Japan to accelerate the development of nuclear power in an effort to achieve national energy security.
“With such a powerful mandate, nuclear power became an unstoppable force, immune to scrutiny by civil society. Its regulation was entrusted to the same government bureaucracy responsible for its promotion,” it said.
This led to the emergence of a “tightly knit elite” supported by huge financial resources and a Japanese bureaucracy, in which everyone’s first duty was to defend the organisation, rather than protect public safety.
“Only by grasping this mindset can one understand how Japan’s nuclear industry managed to avoid absorbing the critical lessons learned from Three Mile Island and Chernobyl; and how it became accepted practice to resist regulatory pressure and cover up small-scale accidents,” said Kurokawa.
The chairman concluded: “The consequences of negligence at Fukushima stand out as catastrophic, but the mindset that supported it can be found across Japan. In recognising that fact, each of us should reflect on our responsibility as individuals in a democratic society.”