US final report: Deepwater Horizon down to BP ... and many others

London – The Deepwater Horizon drilling rig disaster happened because of failings at many levels among the companies involved as well as by government bodies charged with ensuring the safety of oil & gas exploration, the US National Oil Spill Commission has concluded.

The Commission, in particular, linked the disaster on 20 April 2010 to a series of “identifiable mistakes” made by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean.

Failures by these companies “reveal such systematic failures in risk management that they place in doubt the safety culture of the entire industry,” the Commission stated in the final report on its investigation into the accident.

Better management by BP and its partners Halliburton and Transocean would almost certainly have prevented the blowout, said the commission.

“Most of the mistakes and oversights at Macondo,” it stated, “could be traced back to a single overarching failure - a failure of management.”

The commission also noted: “Whether purposeful or not, many of the decisions that BP, Halliburton and Transocean made that increased the risk of the Macondo blowout clearly saved those companies significant time (and money).”

A number of engineering mistakes and management failures were highlighted by the commission. They include:

· Inadequate risk evaluation and management of late-stage well design decisions;

· A flawed design for the cement slurry used to seal the bottom of the well, which was developed without adequate engineering review or operator supervision;

· A negative pressure test conducted to evaluate the cement seal at the bottom of the well identified problems but was incorrectly judged a success because of insufficiently rigorous test procedures and inadequate training of key personnel;

· Flawed procedures for securing the well that called for unnecessarily removing drilling mud from the wellbore that, if left in place, would have helped prevent hydrocarbons from entering the well and causing the blowout;

· Apparent inattention to key initial signals of the impending blowout; 

· An ineffective response to the blowout once it began.

But the final report, published 11 Jan, also takes a broader views of the underlying factors of the accident (see panel), and called for improved corporate and government safety rules and response practices.

“We reach these conclusions, and make necessary recommendations, in a constructive spirit: We aim to promote changes that will make American offshore energy exploration and production far safer, today and in the future,” said the report.

The Commission also acknowledged that the disaster in the Gulf had undermined public faith in the energy industry, government regulators, and even our own capability as a nation to respond to crises.

“It is our hope that a thorough and rigorous accounting, along with focused suggestions for reform, can begin the process of restoring confidence. There is much at stake, not only for the people directly affected in the Gulf region, but for the American people at large.

“The tremendous resources that exist within our outer continental shelf belong to the nation as a whole.

“The federal government’s authority over the shelf is accordingly plenary, based on its power as both the owner of the resources and in its regulatory capacity as sovereign to protect public health, safety, and welfare. To be allowed to drill on the outer continental shelf is a privilege to be earned, not a private right to be exercised.”

The Commission’s conclusions, however, drew fire from the American Petroleum Institute, which said the report casts doubt on an entire industry based on its study of a single incident.

“This does a great disservice to the thousands of men and women who work in the industry and have the highest personal and professional commitment to safety,” said API upstream director Erik Milito.

While welcoming a proposal for increased funding for the federal agency responsible for inspecting and monitoring offshore activity,
Milito said that since the Gulf accident, the industry had taken many steps to further improve safety.

“The explosion was a tragic accident that never should have happened,” said Milito. “But an accurate assessment must acknowledge all the facts, such as the numerous concrete actions that industry has taken both before and since the accident … as well as the many recommendations made by the industry that have already been adopted by the government and industry.”